Japan's response to the 'war on terror ', 
 (Midford 2003; Sato 2003: 4) 
. Hence, the ATSML and LCSMHRA may not lead to any fundamental deviation from the traditional pattern of the incremental expansion of Japan's security role both independently and in conjunction with the US, which still leaves in place the constitutional and other prohibitions on the use of Japanese military power. Japan's attempts to limit the type of capabilities and missions prescribed for the JSDF, including, as investigated below, Aegis despatch and JSDF non-combat zone operations, can be seen as one indication of its continued ultra-caution about committing military forces to overseas operations. For others, as mentioned above, Japan's recent actions represent a major incremental leap in its security policy that could take it to the point-of-no-return, or 'crossing the Rubicon', in terms of breaking with its past traditions. This is due to the fact that, even though the ATSML and LCSMHRA have not challenged openly many of the constitutional prohibitions on Japan's exercise of military force and the role of the JSDF, they have established de facto precedents of cooperation with the US and other states in the case of the global 'war on terror' which mean that Japan will be obliged eventually to
apply the same levels of cooperation to bilateral security cooperation with the US in other regional and global crises (McCormack 2001; Sakamoto 2002 (Funabashi 1991 (Funabashi -1992 (Hughes 1998 (Tamura 2001: 4; Asahi Shimbun, 16 September 2001: 4 (Yachi 2002: 12) . (Greenwood 2002: 311-312 (Kamiya 2004: 14-15 (Yachi 2002: 15 (Hook et al, 2001: 210) (Hughes 1999: 12-25 (Mochizuki 1997 
Japan's design of the ATSML

MOFA, the JDA, and the LDP were all in accord from the start that Japan's principal contribution, in line with US and international expectations, should be in the form of JSDF despatch and at least match that of the Shūhen Jitaihō in its functional scope, and thus include activities such as refuelling and logistical supply for US forces. Sections of the JDA and the LDP initially proposed that the GOJ should utilise the revised Japan-US Defence Guidelines and Shūhen Jitaihō as readily available and extendable framework to provide support for the US
Secondly, the revised Defence Guidelines were viewed as under-restrictive, in that, if used for the Afghan campaign, this would set a precedent for JSDF despatch that would undermine previous GOJ attempts to retain control over the geographical and functional scope of its military and so heighten the risks of entrapment in US regional and global military contingencies (Asahi Shimbun, 16 September 2001: 4).
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Legal justifications and the UN: shifting from Article 9 to the Preamble
GOJ policy-makers also exercised considerable ingenuity in their interpretation of constitutional prohibitions in order to
Implications of Afghan and Iraq despatch for Japan's security policy
Japan attempting to hedge against entrapment
Japan's design of JSDF despatch to the Afghan campaign and to Iraq demonstrates considerable subtlety, and, consequently, the implications of these activities for its overall security policy direction also need to be divined with some sophistication. Japan's participation in the 'war on terror' does contain potentially radical implications for its security, but this should not be overstated. Japanese policy-makers in devising their response to Afghanistan and Iraq have remained highly wary of entrapment in US-inspired contingencies worldwide and within the East Asia region, and therefore continued to pursue hedging options to limit these risks. Japan has based the ATSML and LCSMHRA as the legal frameworks for JSDF despatch upon relevant UN resolutions. Moreover, the GOJ has ensured that each JSDF despatch to Afghanistan and Iraq is enabled by separate laws. The ATSML and LC-SMHRA, although modelled on each other, and using the revised Defence Guidelines as a form of legislative template, are in turn entirely separate from the legal framework of the US-Japan security treaty. Japan in using UN resolutions as the overt legal trigger for JSDF despatch has thus created opt-out clauses to escape involvement in US-led operations that it does not
. At the same time, though, the GOJ was engaged in more than just another US-directed exercise in burden-sharing (or indeed burden-shifting, given initial Bush administration reluctance to engage in 'nation-building' in Afghanistan), and its diplomacy and emphasis on the use of economic power reflected a degree of divergence in Japanese and US perceptions of the most appropriate means to respond to the challenge of al-Qaeda. The GOJ's interest in dealing with immediate humanitarian problems and the reconstruction of the Afghan state was motivated by its past patterns of security policy which have viewed economic dislocation as root causes of intra-and inter-state security and the generation of terrorism
